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NOTE: WALLIS v. MRS. SMITH'S PIE CO.
The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with
quaking quagmires, and inhabitated by learned but eccentric pro-
fessors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and
incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer is quite
lost when engulfed and entangled in it.'
An Arkansas man and a Pennsylvania truckdriver employed by
Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., the defendant, were involved in a rear-end
collision on a snowy December morning. Plaintiffs T.J. Wallis and
his mother, Mary Wallis, were returning home to Arkansas from a
trip to Ohio. While traveling in Missouri they ran into a heavy
snowstorm. The right lane of the interstate had an accumulation of
rain and snow, so Wallis pulled into the left lane. Defendant's truck,
which was on its way to Oklahoma, also pulled over in that lane and
struck plaintiff's car in the rear.
The plaintiffs brought an action in Arkansas against the defen-
dant, a Pennsylvania corporation licensed to do business in Arkan-
sas.' The application of the Arkansas law of comparative negligence
was requested, 3 but the judge instructed the jury to apply the Mis-
souri law, which allowed the complete defense of contributory negli-
gence,4 because the accident had occurred in Missouri. Missouri law
required cars to travel in the right hand lane of traffic and any
violation of that law, except under conditions not applicable to this
case, was negligence per se.5 Therefore, judgment was returned for
the defendant.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed and
remanded.' The court held that, in a tort case, a forum need not
apply the law of the state where the cause of action accrued but is
free to apply the substantive law of a state which it finds has a
significant interest in the outcome of the action. Wallis v. Mrs.
Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
1. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953).
2. Motor Carrier Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 73-1754, et seq. (Repl. 1957).
3. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1763 to 65 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Arkansas' comparative negli-
gence law requires the finder of fact to compare the negligence of the parties and award
damages where the negligence of the defendant exceeds that of the plaintiff. Damages are
reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence.
4. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 509.090 (Vernon 1952) sets contributory negligence out as one
defense which must be pled affirmatively.
5. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 304.015 (6) (Vernon 1973). Plaintiff admitted at trial that he was
aware of this law.
6. Only Mr. Wallis' suit was remanded as the instruction was apparently not given for
Mrs. Wallis.
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The rules governing conflict of laws have undergone several
changes through the country's history. Prior to the Civil War the
doctrine of lex fori (law of the forum) was the predominant choice
of law formula in tort actions. "It is a well-settled rule, founded on
reason and authority, that the lex Jori . . . furnish in all cases,
prima facie, the rule of decision . . . ."I Most courts accepted the
doctrine, never questioning the reason or authority supporting it.
One court stated: "The action here is a personal action, for personal
injury, governed by the lex fori. This is almost too familiar a princi-
ple for discussion or authority."8 The virtue of this choice of law
theory was in its ease of application9 since each court merely applied
its own law to suits brought in its jurisdiction.
The lex fori doctrine, however, was criticized because it refused
to recognize the interest of other states in having their own laws
enforced to protect their citizens and to further the interest of the
state. ° This was a problem in cases where liability arose only under
the law where the accident occurred. Of particular importance was
the case of a tort based on breach of a statutory duty. The law of
the place should have been enforced in that situation, because that
state had a police interest in having its law enforced.
The criticism of lex fori led to a movement toward lex loci
delecti (law of the place of injury). As early as 1857 a New York
court refused to apply its wrongful death statute to a Connecticut
accident because "[wihether an act or omission affords a right of
action depends on the law of the place where it was done or omit-
ted.""' The trend toward the doctrine was expressed in dictum in an
1880 United States Supreme Court case, Dennick v. Central
Railroad.'2 This case involved a suit by a plaintiff-administratrix to
recover damages for the death of her husband. The injury occurred
7. Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226, 253 (1860), citing Monroe v. Douglass, 1 N.Y. 816, 817
(1851). See also Field, Outlines of an International Code 439 (1872) and Ehrenzweig, The Lex
Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637, 667 (1960).
8. Anderson v. Milwaukee & S.P. R.R., 37 Wis. 321, 322 (1875).
9. Comment, Changes in Tort Conflict of Laws in Missouri, 37 Mo. L. Rev. 268, 269
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Changes].
10. See generally Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum; 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 964 (1958), reprinted in B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 1, 9 (1963).
English practice is to apply the law of the forum "until it is displaced by a different law with
a greater claim to recognition, brought forward by a party wishing to take advantage of the
difference .... " See also R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 200 (1971).
11. Vandventer v. New York & N.H. R.R., 27 Barb. 244, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1857).
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 674.
12. 103 U.S. 11 (1880). See also Louis-Dryfus v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., 43 F.2d 824
(2d Cir. 1930); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (per Holmes, J.); Alabama
G. S. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
in New Jersey and the administratrix was appointed in New York.
The New Jersey law, however, would allow recovery only if its courts
appointed the administratrix. The Supreme Court allowed recovery,
saying that trespass to the person was transitory and venue imma-
terial. The Court announced that "[w]henever, by either the com-
mon law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become
fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced
and the right of action pursued in any court which has the jurisdic-
tion of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties."' 3
The Arkansas courts have always followed the lex loci delecti
doctrine. The earliest tort case where a choice of law question was
raised was Carter v. Goode, 4 decided in 1887. Plaintiff brought an
action against defendant, who had shot plaintiff's mule. The inci-
dent occurred in the Cherokee Nation where it was not a trespass
to shoot a mule. The court, in denying recovery, said that "[i]n
order to maintain an action of tort founded upon an injury to person
or property, the act which is the cause of the injury . . . must be
actionable . . .by the law of the place where the injury is done."'"
A later case, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v.
Brown," followed Carter in holding that "[t]he law of the place
where the cause of action arose, and not the lex fori controls."
The basis of the traditional doctrine of lex loci delecti was the
vested rights rule, developed most fully by Professor Joseph H.
Beale." His theory was that the right to recover damages in a tort
action became vested in the plaintiff at the time and place of the
injury and should thus be governed by the law of that place." He
felt that the single most significant factor'9 by which controlling law
should be determined was the place where the incident occurred. 0
At the time Professor Beale developed his theory, it had a considera-
ble amount of practical merit because "the situation in this country
was such that people rarely crossed state boundaries. Under such
13. Dennick v. Central R.R., 103 U.S. 11, 18 (1880). See Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at
674.
14. 50 Ark. 155, 6 S.W. 719 (1888).
15. Id. at 156, 6 S.W. at 720.
16. 67 Ark. 295, 54 S.W. 865 (1899). See also Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Independent
Ice Co., 190 Ark. 684, 80 S.W.2d 626 (1935).
17. J. Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935). This three-volume treatise contains his most
extensive writings on the subject.
18. See Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 384 (1934). "(1) If a cause of action
is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no
cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other
state."
19. See Leflar's discussion of Beale. R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 205 (1968).
20. Id.
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circumstances, there was validity in a rule which presumed that
persons changing jurisdiction were aware of the duties and obliga-
tions they were incurring because of such change."'"
Professor Beale was the Reporter in charge of drafting the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws and influenced the Restatement to
adopt his theories." The adoption of Beale's theory, however, was
not accepted. by everyone; several members of the Advisory Com-
mittee resigned before the Restatement was completed in protest
against Beale's rigid formulation."
According to many courts the logic of lex loci delecti possessed
the virtues of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result .2
Further, there was little danger of interstate judicial jealousy as the
forum usually deferred to the place of wrong. 2 Ideally, no matter
where a party sought to enforce a cause of action, the outcome would
be the same. Thus, in a sense, the reasonable expectations of the
parties in the outcome were protected .2 This was not always the
case in an accident claim because a resident of state A traveling
through state B would have no such reasonable expectation since he
would not intend to be injured. Thus, he could not predict that he
would have a cause of action.
In such situations, adherence to lex loci delecti often led to
harsh results. In Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co., 7 an
Arkansas plaintiff was injured while working for the defendant, an
Arkansas corporation which had an Arkansas contract to build a
bridge from the Arkansas side of the river to Oklahoma. The plain-
tiff was hired and paid in Arkansas, but he was injured while work-
ing past midstream. The Arkansas court said that since the injury
occurred past midstream, the place of injury was Oklahoma, and
Oklahoma law must apply. Since Oklahoma law provided an exclu-
sive remedy in workmen's compensation, the tort claim was dis-
21. Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, -, 243 A.2d 917, 920 (1968). This case dis-
cussed the background of the vested rights theory.
22. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 205. Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 668. See also Restate-
ment (First) of Conflicts of Laws §§ 377-397 (1934).
23. See R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 205. See generally W. Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws, passim (1942). "Walter Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-
rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual
product of another." B. Currie, supra note 10, at 6.
24. See, e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 627; Heidemann v. Rohl, 86
S.D. 250, -, 194 N.W.2d 164, 167 (1972); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 513 (Miss. 1968).
See also R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 206.
25. See R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 317-319 and Comment, Changes, supra note 9, at
271.
26. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 970-972
(1952).
27. 157 Ark. 528. 249 S.W. 21 (1923).
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missed. If the court had applied Arkansas law, plaintiff's claim
would not have been dismissed, as the Arkansas law at that time
did not preclude tort actions for injuries covered under workmen's
compensation.2S
Arkansas continued to adhere to the rigid doctrine of lex loci
delecti in Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,2" which
involved an Arkansas passenger who had been injured in a bus
mishap in Missouri and died in Arkansas about two weeks later. The
Arkansas court held that an action for wrongful death must be
based on the statute of limitations of the place where the injury that
caused the death occurred. Arkansas had a two year statute of limi-
tations on wrongful death actions at that time,3" and Missouri had
a one year statute of limitations. Since the action had not been
brought within the time prescribed by the Missouri statute, the case
was dismissed. The case, however, would not have been dismissed
if Arkansas law had been applied as the suit had been filed within
the two year period.
The application of guest statutes is another instance where fol-
lowing lex loci delecti may lead to harsh results. The Arkansas guest
statute prohibits a guest riding in a motor vehicle from recovering
damages when the vehicle is involved in an accident unless the
operator was willfully or wantonly negligent."
Dissatisfaction with the mechanical and arbitrary application
of the lex loci delecti rule led a numer of courts to resort to various
means by which the doctrine could be circumvented.2 One escape
device was to classify the conflict of laws question as procedural
rather than substantive.33 Since a forum court is not bound to follow
28. In 1948 Arkansas provided for an exclusive remedy in workmen's compensation.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1304 (Repl. 1976).
29. 207 Ark. 601, 182 S.W.2d 214 (1944).
30. Pope's Dig. Ark. §§ 1277, 1278. The Arkansas Statute passed in 1957 provides a
three-year statute of limitations. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-907 (Repl. 1962).
31. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-913 (Repl. 1957). The Arkansas guest statute was applied by
the Louisiana court in Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So.2d 216 (1970)
to deny recovery to a Louisiana plaintiff who had been a guest in a Louisiana car which was
involved in a rear-end collision in Arkansas. The Louisiana appellate court had allowed
recovery by applying Louisiana law, which had no guest statute requiring a showing of
willfulness on the part of the driver. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 218 So.2d 375 (La.
App. 1969). The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed and applied Arkansas law under the
lex loci delecti principle, which resulted in a denial of recovery under the Arkansas guest
statute. Case was subsequently overruled in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co., - La. __,
276 So.2d 309, 312 (1973).
32. See R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 212; Cook, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws,
51 Yale L.J. 191 (1941); Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, and Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 Yale L.J. 743 (1941).
33. Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); Restatement (First) of Conflict
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the procedural law of the place of injury, forum law could be ap-
plied. 4 The Arkansas court, however, could not have used this de-
vice in Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc.,35 because
statutes of limitations in wrongful death actions are generally classi-
fied as substantive rather than procedural. 6
Another method used by the courts to circumvent lex loci
delecti was to characterize the cause of action as sounding in some-
thing other than tort and to apply the choice-of-law rule of that
action. 7 Renvoi was frequently used by the courts as an escape
device." This complicated and mysterious doctrine allows a court
to resort to the foreign law of conflict of laws, which law may in turn
refer the court back to the law of the forum. The courts also avoided
resorting to lex loci delecti by arguing that the law of the state where
the injury occurred was contrary to the strong public policy of the
forum ."
These various means of circumventing lex loci delecti have not
escaped criticism. One authority's view is that all the exceptions
"are designed to reach results indirectly which could be reached
directly by recognizing the lex [ori as the rule primarily to be ap-
plied."' Another critic said that "[t]he principal vice of the public
policy concepts is that they provide a substitute for analysis. The
concepts stand in the way of careful thought, of discriminating dis-
of Laws § 584 (1934) stated, "The court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict
of Laws rule whether a given question is one of substance or procedure."
34. E.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961) (measure of damages classified as a procedural matter); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival of action is procedural); Huckaby v. St. Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry., 119 Ark. 179, 177 S.W. 923 (1915) (questions relating to burden of proof are
governed by the laws of the forum). See also Weintraub, supra note 10, at 45.
35. 207 Ark. 601, 182 S.W.2d 214 (1944). See also Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329
S.W.2d 426 (1959) (statute of limitations was substantive and governed by the place of injury,
Texas).
36. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 305.
37. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (administration of
decedents' estates); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Con-
flict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958), reprinted in B. Currie, supra note 10, at 128.
38. E.g., In re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Surr. Ct. 1950),
adhered to on reargument, 198 Misc. 1017, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950); University of
Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936). See also Griswold, Renvoi Revisted,
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1166-70 (1938).
39. E.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961) (New York public policy against limiting damages in wrongful death actions basis
for applying New York law). Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963) (New
Hampshire court, on public policy grounds, refused to follow the Massachusetts law of inter-
spousal immunity and applied New Hampshire's law which recognized no such doctrine).
40. Ehrenzweig, supra note 7, at 671.
tinction, and of true policy development in the conflict of laws.""
Other authorities have criticized this doctrine.4" Subsequently,
the demand for some better statement of the law developed in ear-
nest.":1 It was felt that lex loci delecti was inconsistent with the
Restatement's basic statement of method: "Each court . . . derives
[its choice of law rules] from the same sources used for determining
all its law: from precedent, from analogy, from legal reason and from
consideration of ethical and social need.""
One formula that emerged early in the quest for a better law
was the dominant contacts or most significant relationship test.4"
Under this theory, the courts weighed contacts that the parties had
with each state and the law of the state which had the dominant
contacts was the law applied. The leading case using that theory
was Babcock v. Jackson,4" a New York guest statute case in which
the court said that New York had the dominant contacts with the
cause of action since both parties were domiciled in New York, were
on a trip that began and would end in New York, and the accident
occurred only fortuitously in Ontario. The test for applying the
theory was a flexible one "in the sense that its key phrase, 'most
significant contacts,' lacks an exactly defined content and so leaves
room for the use of judicial discretion." 7
Professor Brainerd Currie, the late modern conflicts scholar,
sought to simplify conflicts law for forum courts. To this end he
developed the governmental interest formula to determine the
41. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969,
1016 (1956).
42. W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942); B. Currie,
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963); E. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict
of Laws (1947); G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1951); Cheatham & Reese,
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev, 959 (1952); Yntema, The Hornbook Method
and the Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L.J. 468 (1927).
43. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 219.
44. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 5, comment b (emphasis added). See
Comment, Changes, supra note 9, at 271.
45. The nicknames "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" were also given to
the formulas. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 220.
46. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Babcock has been the
subject of numerous studies, e.g., Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar, and Reese,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 1212 (1963). "After Babcock and Griffith [v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964)] lighted the way, other courts rushed to follow . . . . [Alt least 21 states have
rejected the place-of-wrong rule in some context . R. Weintraub, supra note 10, at 234
(cases cited n. 36).
47. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 222. Leflar adds that "[tihe formula affords no real
basis for decision in the hard cases because it does not identify the considerations which
control the flexibility that it allows, which move courts to go one way or the other within the
formula."
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choice of law.49 Such interest would, for example, include the state's
interest in the education, support, maintenance, and custody of a
child. Currie's final conclusion on the matter was that if the forum
state has a governmental interest in the application of its own laws,
its laws should be applied regardless of the interests of other states."
Having determined that courts should look at various factors
besides the place of injury in deciding choice of law questions, com-
mentators formulated lists of choice-influencing factors. Cheatham
and Reese made the first thorough effort to list and analyze such
considerations. '0 They used nine policy factors (listed in order of
importance) to be considered in choosing the applicable law:
1. The needs of the interstate and international system;
2. Application of local law unless there is good reason for not
doing so;
3. Effectuation of the purpose of relevant local rule in determin-
ing a question of choice of law;
4. Certainty, predictability, uniformity of results;
5. Protection of justified expectations;
6. Application of the law of the state of dominant interest;
7. Ease in determination of applicable law; convenience of the
court;
8. The fundamental policy underlying the broad local law field
involved;
9. Justice in the individual case.5'
Professor Yntema listed seventeen policy considerations rele-
vant to the choice of law process 2 and then reduced them to two
48. "The term governmental interest has been defined as the product of (a) a govern-
mental policy and (b) the concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship between the
state having the policy and transaction, the parties or the litigation." B. Currie, supra note
10, at 621.
49. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 224.
50. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952).
Professor Reese later added a tenth policy: "The court must follow the dictates of its own
legislature, provided these dictates are constitutional." Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 679, 682 (1963). See also Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969), for the Restatement list of relevant factors.
51. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952).
52. Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 Can. B. Rev. 721, 734-35
(1957). They include uniformity of legal consequences, minimization of conflicts of laws,
predictability of legal consequences, the reasonable expectations of the parties, uniformity
of social and economic consequences, validation of transactions, relative significance of con-
tacts, recognition of the "stronger" law, cooperation among states, respect for interests of
other states, justice of the end results, respect for policies of domestic law, internal harmony
of the substantive rules to be applied, location or nature of the transaction, private utility,
homogeneity of national law, and ultimate recourse to the lex fori.
main groups: security and comparative justice.53 Professor Cavers
formulated principles of preference for courts to use as guides in
resolving specific problems and fact situations involved in choice of
law situations.54
In 1966 Professor Leflar developed a list of five factors which
he felt were primarily significant:
1. Predictability of results.
2. Maintenance of interstate and international order.
3. Simplification of the judicial task.
4. Advancement of the forum's governmental interest.
5. Application of the better rule of law. 5
Leflar has noted that:
An approach which looks directly and specifically to the relevant
choice-influencing considerations, rather than one looking to some
formula supposedly derived from the considerations by earlier
alchemists, has the virtue of enabling the judges to concentrate on
all of the real values, as they see them, that are present in their
case.
56
Obviously some of Leflar's considerations will be more relevant
to some types of cases than others. The first consideration, predicta-
bility of results, relates mainly to contracts made with reference to
the law of a particular state. In this situation, justice would be
served by applying the law of that state.57 This consideration, how-
ever, has little applicability to automobile accident cases as they are
not planned.
The second consideration is the maintenance of interstate and
international order which requires reasonable orderliness and a good
relationship among the states. Interstate travel between the states
would not be impaired by the application of Leflar's method. In
terms of automobile accident litigation, no more is required than
that a court apply the law of a state which has a substantial connec-
tion with the causes of action being litigated.58
53. Id.
54. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 139-203 (1965). "The Cavers approach illus-
trates cogently the possibility of using the policy evaluation process as a means of dealing
with specific problems and narrow areas of decision." R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 243.
55. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267,
282 (1966).
56. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 Calif. L. Rev.
1584, 1598 (1966).
57. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 245.
58. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, - , 222 A.2d 205, 208 (1966).
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Simplification of the judicial task is the third consideration.
While the mechanical choice of using the law of the place of injury
was easy to administer, it is usually easier for a forum court to apply
its own more familiar law than any other. 9
The fourth consideration is advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interest. This is not necessarily synonymous with domestic
law." "In most private litigation the only real governmental interest
that the forum has is in the fair and efficient administration of
justice, which is usually true of automobile accident cases.'", If two
states have divergent interests, then advancement of the forum's
interest must be accepted as one legitimate part of the choice-of-law
process. 2
The fifth and final consideration is the application of the better
rule of law which in most situations is that which prevents harsh
and unfair results and instead, furthers the interests of justice. 3 One
authority noted that courts applying Leflar's "desiderata" to torts
cases accord the better rule more weight than the other four fac-
tors. 4 While the better rule consideration may often lead the forum
to apply its own law, this will not occur in all instances as judges
will, in appropriate cases, recognize the forum law as an anachron-
ism, a drag on the coattails of civilization." This is especially evi-
dent in comparative versus contributory negligence choice.
Prior to 1976 approximately twenty-four jurisdictions had dis-
carded the rule of the place of injury and applied one of the afore-
mentioned analytical theories or processes." One court noted that
59. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 250.
60. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, - , 222 A.2d 205, 208 (1966).
61. Id.
62. R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 254.
63. In contract situations the "better rule" will usually be the one that upholds a fair
transaction into which the parties entered in good faith. See Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bk., 239 Ark. 738, 393 S.W.2d 867 (1965); Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37,
364 S.W.2d 158 (1963); R. Leflar, supra note 19, at 255.
64. Juenger, Torts Choice of Law in Michigan, 52 Mich. S.B.J. 730, 733 n.1 (1973).
65. Fruend, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1210 (1946).
66. First Nat'l Bk. v. Rostek, 182 Col. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Jagers v. Royal Indemn-
ity Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (1973); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Beaulieu v.
Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 1970); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254
(1968); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 92 Idaho 718, 449 P.2d 378 (1968); Schneider v.
Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss.
1968); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand &
Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d
727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967);
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2'd 625
(1967); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Wart% 11 v.
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"[n]o American court which has felt free to re-examine the matter
thoroughly in the last decade has chosen to retain the old rule."6 7
The court admitted, however, that some courts have retained the
doctrine in recent decisions. The court attributed the failure to re-
ject it to legal paralysis, an unwillingness by the courts to adandon
established precedent before they were sure that a better rule was
available, and not to any belief that the old rule was a good one. 8
The Arkansas court has not been struck by such paralysis. In
1966 the court was asked to overrule the lex loci delecti doctrine in
McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 9 but chose to retain it. How-
ever, under almost any theory of conflicts law the court's choice of
law would have been correct. The deceased was killed in a collision
with defendant's vehicle in Missouri. 0 The plaintiffs first brought
suit in Missouri and then in federal district court in Arkansas" and,
finally, in an Arkansas court. The Arkansas Supreme Court af-
firmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court noted that the
deceased was not an Arkansas resident; the administratrix was not
appointed by an Arkansas court; the accident was not in Arkansas;
in fact, the only contact with Arkansas was the defendant's place
of business. Under those circumstances the court said it would not
allow the plaintiff "to shop around" to find some forum (Arkansas
in this instance) which had a more favorable statute than that of
Missouri."
In the present case, Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,7" the Arkan-
sas court departed from the mechanical application of the tradi-
tional lex loci delecti rule and applied the more flexible approach
available through the use of Leflar's choice-influencing considera-
tions in conflict of laws problems. The court noted that the lex loci
delecti doctrine had been the subject of much criticism:
[Tihe vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited be-
Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d (1966); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Fabricius v. Horgen,
257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See
Weintraub, supra note 10, at 234 n. 36.
67. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, -, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (1966).
68. Id.
69. 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
70. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965).
71. Glick v. Ballentine Produe, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965).
72. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965).
73. 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
74. Id. at 537, 408 S.W.2d at 893 (1966).
75. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977).
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cause it fails to take account of underlying policy considerations
in evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance
that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabili-
ties which arise out of that act.7"
The more flexible approach was recognized by the Arkansas
court77 as being in accord with the Restatement Second of Conflict
of Laws:
In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties, unless, with respect to a particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be
applied."'
In addition to the Restatement, the Arkansas court relied heav-
ily on the analysis of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Mitchell v.
Craft. 79 Mitchell involved two Mississippi residents who were killed
when their automobiles collided in Louisiana. The plaintiff-
administratrix brought a wrongful death action against the
defendant-administratrix in Mississippi. The defendant argued
that the Louisiana doctrine of contributory negligence should be
applied, but the Mississippi court, abandoning the lex loci delecti
doctrine and applying the most significant relationship rule, af-
firmed the lower court's application of the Mississippi comparative
negligence doctrine.'"
The Arkansas court followed the Mitchell analysis of the Mis-
sissippi court,"' particularly as it related to the five "choice-
influencing considerations" set out by Professor Leflar.8 2
The Mississippi court (and later the Arkansas court)83 viewed
the first three considerations as having little relevance and found
the advancement of the forum's governmental interest to be the
76. Id. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 456 (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)).
77. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 628, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977).
78. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971). The Restatement notes in
a comment that the state whose interests are most deeply affected should have its law
applied. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 Choice-of-Law Principles, 14
(1971). According to Leflar the Restatement intends that this consideration should control
other choice-of-law considerations. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas-The Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 28 Ark. L. Rev. 199, 203 n.25 (1974).
79. 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968).
80. Id. at 514.
81. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 628, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977).
82. Leflar, supra note 55, at 282.
83. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 629, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977).
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primary consideration in determining the applicable law.8" Actually,
the court in Mitchell found that Louisiana had no interest in the
controversy. Another important consideration to the Mississippi
court was the better rule of law.85 Thus the court resolved the con-
flicts of law issue by reasoning that the comparable negligence law
of Mississippi was fairer and more equitable than Louisiana's law
of contributory negligence.
In order to help resolve the conflict of laws question in Wallis,
the Arkansas court considered the circumstances surrounding the
case.8 1 Particularly the court noted that the action was brought by
Arkansas residents against a foreign corporation authorized to do
business in Arkansas. The only contact with Missouri was found to
be the fortuitous occurrence of the accident on a Missouri highway
while the parties were enroute to other states.
The court also relied heavily on an analysis of the fourth and
fifth of Leflar's considerations, governmental interest and the better
rule of law. With respect to the fourth consideration, the court found
that it had a duty to further Arkansas' governmental interest.8
Finding that the policy of Arkansas as manifested in its comparative
fault statute88 was to protect its injured residents by permitting
compensation to a plaintiff even though his negligence contributed
to his injury, the Arkansas court reasoned 0 that it could best further
Arkansas' governmental interest in the welfare of its citizens
through the application of its comparative fault statute.
In addition the court looked to the last of Leflar's considera-
tions, the application of the better rule of law," which weighed
heavily in favor of comparative negligence. The court noted that
"[t]he decided trend is away from the harsh application of the
contributory negligence rule of law"" and further noted that ap-
proximately thirty-five jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, the
defendant's home state,93 had enacted comparative negligence laws.
84. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 514 (Miss. 1968).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 628, 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1977).
88. Id. at 632, 550 S.W.2d at 458. A governmental interest is found where "there is a
reasonable basis for application of the law of a state in order to effectuate the specific policy
that it embodied." B. Currie, supra note 10, at 489.
89. 1973 Ark. Acts 303, §§ 1-3 (replaced by Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1764 to 65 (Cum.
Supp. 1975)).
90. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 632, 550 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1977).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 1976 Pa. Laws 152.
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The court also recognized that, in the abstract, comparative negli-
gence is fairer and results in a more economically equitable stan-
dard of liability. 4
By abandoning the traditional doctrine of lex loci delecti, the
Arkansas court has emerged from the "dismal swamp."95 Now the
court will be able to make a rational choice of governing law unen-
cumbered by the rigid rule of the vested-rights school which totally
lacked any substantive value." The abandonment, however, does
not simplify the court's solution of these problems. The adoption of
this new rule, which does not afford the benefit of mechanical sim-
plicity, will render the choice more demanding. At the same time,
however, the flexibility provided for by Wallis will prevent the
courts from being engulfed or entangled in the "quaking quag-
mires"97 of conflict of laws.
The interest analysis approach will allow judges to give appro-
priate consideration to the particular facts of each case. With this
new-found freedom, judges will be forced to analyze cases as they
should have been analyzing them all along and to enunciate the real
reasons for their decisions.
Carolyn Brack Armbrust
94. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 632, 550 S.W.2d 453, 458 (1977).
95. Prosser, supra note 1, at 971.
96. See 39 Tul. L. Rev. 163, 178 (1964).
97. Prosser, supra note 1, at 971.
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